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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. No. 870053 
ARDEN BRETT BULLOCK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
On October 18, 1989 the conviction of Appellant Arden Brett 
Bullock was affirmed by a three-two decision of this Court. 
Subsequently, this Court revoked Defendant's Certificate of 
Probable Cause. On October 31, 1989 the lower court granted 
Defendant's Motion to reissue a Certificate of Probable Cause 
and/or to stay execution of the sentence until such time as 
Appellant has had the opportunity to exhaust his rehearing rights 
pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Defendant is aware that rehearings are rarely granted by 
this Court. This is especially true in light of the probable 
lengthy discussions occurring between the justices in the 
majority and in the dissent. It is likely, therefore, that the 
two justices of this Court and the one justice of the Court of 
Appeals sitting by designation have firmly fixed their position 
as to the arguments advanced in the dissenting opinion and 
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previously by Appellant in his brief. However, it is the fervant 
hope of Defendant that this "cementing" can be temporarily broken 
in order to allow Defendant the opportunity to address several 
matters contained in the majority and concurring opinions which 
have been overlooked or misapprehended. Since Defendant is 
facing a minimum mandatory sentence of 15 years imprisonment with 
a possible life sentence because of the decision in this case it 
is urged that the Court review this case as carefully as it would 
a capital case. 
Thus, Defendant brings this Petition for Rehearing for the 
purpose of having one final opportunity to assert his belief that 
his conviction was against all manifest justice and to give the 
majority members of this Court a further opportunity to review 
these arguments. In addition, if Defendant is required to go 
into the federal system to vindicate his conviction Defendant 
wants it to be made perfectly clear that the state courts have 
had opportunity to correct these problems. 
There are several areas that this Petition for Rehearing 
will address. While some are relatively minor corrections of the 
majority and concurring opinion others contain serious discussion 
as to the analysis made in these opinions. Because of the 
brevity of this Petition Defendant has chosen not to label each 
of these areas as separate subpoints but to number each area of 
concern as a separate paragraph with a short introductory 
sentence describing the substance of the argument. 
1. Majority Opinion Misconstrued Relief Requested. 
The majority opinion written by Chief Justice Hall states, "Thus, 
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the relief sought on appeal is reversal of the trial court and 
dismissal of the charges." (Slip opinion, p. 1). While this 
statement is correct it is not complete. Throughout the briefing 
of this case and during oral argument additional remedies were 
offered by Appellant. Appellant was aware that it may be 
difficult if not impossible to ask this Court after a conviction 
of this magnitude to totally release him from any further 
criminal proceedings. While he maintains that such relief is 
mandated he has not requested that this be the only remedy 
available. 
Rather, Defendant has also sought two other possible 
remedies. First, a new hearing at the trial court level on the 
issue of reliability of the evidence to determine whether the 
evidence is sufficiently tainted to allow a retrial as to any 
part of it. If upon determination that a complete tainting did 
not occur then a new trial could be ordered as to that portion 
which is free from corruption. 
Second, a hearing could be held to determine the conduct of 
Defendant's attorney by allowing witnesses including the 
defendant to testify as to what exactly was occurring during the 
pretrial and trial of this matter. This request is no different 
than what is requested in a habeas corpus proceeding on claims of 
ineffective counsel. If it is determined that the actions of 
Defendant's counsel was not done under any "strategy" but was 
done merely because of ineffectiveness then this Court would have 
to address the substantive arguments made rather than merely 
being concerned with whether proper objections had been made at 
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the lower level. 
The "all or nothing" relief noted in the opinion seriously 
distorts the available options that this Court has under the 
circumstances of this case. 
2. Factual Omission Concerning Dr. Snow's Conduct. The 
majority opinion on page 3 of the Slip Opinion notes that Dr. 
Snow's interviews, with two exceptions, were not taped. The 
opinion neglects to observe, however, that not only was there no 
video or audio tapes kept of these interviews but there were not 
even written notes available for examination. The majority 
opinion states that the testimony concerning her interviews was 
"based primarily on memory." The interviews in fact were based 
entirely upon her recollections with no other type of supporting 
documentation available. The absence of even minimal notes is a 
further important factor in Defendant's claim of lack of due 
process. 
3. Omission of Doctrine of Fundamental Rights. The 
majority opinion ignores Defendant's claim that he was denied 
fundamental constitutional rights which must be addressed by an 
appellate court even though no objection was made below. 
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1968). This doctrine is 
separate and apart from the "plain error" rule provided by state 
law. 
4. Improper Mixing of "Plain Error" Doctrine and 
Ineffectiveness of Counsel Doctrine. The majority notes that 
Defendant claimed that most of the errors raised on appeal were 
properly before this Court on the basis of two separate and 
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complete doctrines: (1) plain error and (2) ineffectiveness of 
counsel. (Slip Opinion, p. 5). However, in the remainder of 
the opinion, (pp. 6-9) the majority opinion merges the two 
doctrines together by stating that in order for plain error to be 
found it is necessary to address a threshold issue as to whether 
or not Defendant's counsel was ineffective. (Slip Opinion, p. 
6) . 
This merger is inappropriate and incorrect. The arguments 
advanced by Defendant must be analyzed totally and distinctly as 
to plain error and as to ineffectiveness of counsel. The two are 
not necessarily intertwined in every instance. There can be 
plain error with effective counsel and there can be 
ineffectiveness of counsel with no plain error. 
5. The Doctrine of Plain Error Precludes Admission of the 
Tainted Evidence and the Due Process Limitations Regardless of 
the Conduct of Defendant's Attorney. In State v. Eldredge, 
Justice Zimmerman while stating the requirements of "plain error" 
under Utah law made the following comment concerning the purpose 
of the rule, "At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to 
permit us to avoid injustice. No statement of the factors that 
are important to our deliberations on the point should be read to 
limit our power to achieve that end." 
Appellant maintained throughout this appeal that the system 
employed by the State of allowing social workers such as Barbara 
Snow to gather evidence from the children with no recorded or 
otherwise verifiable method of determining the accuracy of the 
interviews and other confrontations with the children violated 
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state and federal due process requirements. This was not, 
therefore, necessarily a question which defense counsel had to 
raise during these proceedings. Instead, it is a fundamental 
right guaranteed to all defendants which this Court under its 
supervisory powers must enforce regardless of what happens in a 
lower court by judges or by attorneys. The allowance of such a 
system and such a plain violation of constitutional protections 
goes well beyond any procedural niceties of a trial and any 
claims that the attorneys must raise such objections. This is a 
substantive issue which should have been addressed by the 
majority opinion regardless of what actions defendant's lower 
court attorney took or did not take. 
It is analogous to a case in which it is discovered that the 
police department of a jurisdiction has no controls over the 
evidence which is kept for prosecution of literally hundreds of 
trials in that jurisdiction. Once this serious irregularity 
comes to the attention of this Court it is its obligation under 
the plain error doctrine to correct the constitutional deficiency 
regardless of whether it was raised below by a defense attorney. 
These types of errors rise well above procedural problems and 
strategies which the majority opinion speaks about in its 
opinion. In other words, a complete system of constitutional 
deprivation was present in this case not only to this defendant 
but to numerous other defendants in which individuals like 
Barbara Snow are allowed to gather evidence and to testify. 
Thus, under this Court's supervisory powers and its 
constitutionally required adherence to federal and state 
constitutional provisions the issue must be addressed regardless 
of the conduct of the parties below, 
6. The Majority's Opinion Relating to Ineffective Counsel 
Failed to Consider a Remand Option, The majority opinion quite 
clearly speculates as to what occurred during the lower court 
proceedings. The majority opinion states, for example, "It is 
reasonable to conclude . . . ."; "he might well have thought 
• . . ."; "having made this decision, counsel could reasonably 
have concluded . . . ." 
The statements made by the majority opinion could be 
correct. On the other hand, Defendant could speculate a number 
of equally plausible reasons why his counsel did not object to 
the evidence prior to trial. Such as: Defendant's counsel was 
not feeling well, he had some sort of domestic problem at home, 
he was overloaded with other cases, or he was preparing to go on 
a vacation to Tahiti, or he was afraid to cross examine children 
at trial. Defendant unfortunately does not know the true reasons 
for his counsel's conduct and neither can this Court based upon 
the present record. 
While arguably in most cases an objective standard of 
conduct is all that is required to overcome the claim of 
ineffectiveness of counsel this case is not one in which that 
standard can be applied. For example, suppose a highway patrol 
officer in Juab County stops an automobile solely because it is 
being driven by a person of Hispanic discent and, after such stop 
a quantity of narcotics is found. It would be expected that any 
competent trial attorney would object to the finding of such 
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evidence and move to suppress it. In fact, Defendant's trial 
attorney did move to suppress in a similar situation in State v. 
Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rptr. 38 (Utah May 17, 1989). If no 
suppression motion is made and the matter goes to trial and the 
defendant is convicted the state could argue, as it has in this 
case, that it was a strategy of the defense to show the hatred of 
the highway patrolman against Mexicans and that the attorney 
assumed that a jury may be so infuriated by this racial prejudice 
that it would overlook the presence of the narcotics in the 
automobile. 
It is difficult if not impossible to imagine any court 
upholding an objective standard of effectiveness of counsel based 
upon such an argument made by the state. Clearly, defense 
counsel would have failed in his duty to protect his client by 
not attempting to keep the damaging evidence out of the jury's 
presence and, in most cases, eliminate a trial all together. 
The same is here also. Had Defendant's trial attorney moved 
prior to the trial to suppress not only the hearsay statements of 
Dr. Snow and Dr. Tyler but also the testmony of the children 
themselves the lower court could at that time have determined the 
merits of any claim as to the methods and constitutionality being 
utilized by the police examiners and social workers. The hearsay 
statutes quoted by this Court contemplate that such a hearing 
is held. However, no such hearing was ever requested by 
Defendant's counsel. 
Had the court denied the motions to suppress the evidence 
nothing differently would have occurred at trial than what did 
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occur. Defense counsel could still attack Dr. Snow in the same 
manner which was done. The video tapes could still have been 
shown in I he JIIVP I csl j nn niy ! the liiildrent cuu.U h.ive benn 
admitted. Absolutely nothing would have changed had the lower 
court found tl: lat thd s evi dence was reliable and not tainted. 
On the other hand, had the court determined that the hearsay 
statements of Snow and Tyler were unreliable and that the 
children be< ause u! I he '/out innnaf inn if iimw .'ouLd m-1 'Mildly 
give reliable testimony either on video tape or at trial then the 
lower court could have dismissed the charges against Defendant 
without subjecting Defendant to a trial by jury This is exactly 
analogous to the car search type of case where there is 
< - - \ . to gai 1:1 and not hi :> 1 ose It is not strategy; it 
is incompetency of the highest level not to assert these rights 
prior to trial. 
It shall also be noted that two alleged clai ms of 
ineffectiveness raised tv Defendant cannot be considered 
"strategic -- - - • - , la/t the majors ty"" s spe -.-
scenario of defense strategy is true. Not objecting t<. tne 
opinion evidence of Snow and Tyler as to the truthfulness of the 
children ami I 111> 1 .Ji • I n I . 11 >11"11" tun I 11ti strategic va 1 ue whatsoevei 
Had objections been made this Court's decision of Rimmasch would 
have given Defendant d ::-r* LJLJLCII. Likewise, the failure to make 
post-trial motions again has no strategic justification since 
strategy only applies to trial—not post-trial. There is nothing 
to lose i n ask inq I" he tr i a3 • 201 irt t o c» irrecti cla 1 med t r ial 
errors. 
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Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion again speculates 
that there is "no assurance that the trial court, or a majority 
of this Court, would accept the proposition advanced by appellate 
counsel and by Justice Stewart that the children were so tainted 
by Barbara Snow's activities that they could never take they 
could never take the stand." (Slip Opinion, p. 9)- This 
statement completely misses the point. Had the lower court 
counsel objected to this testimony at least the issue would be 
preserved for appeal and this Court could determine whether such 
evidence was tainted or not. Since defense counsel failed to 
raise this issue at all Justice Zimmerman's hypothesis that the 
argument of tainting would not be accepted is only speculation 
since the majority opinion clearly states that no substantive 
issues are being examined. Likewise, Justice Zimmerman is 
assuming that if defense counsel succeeded in excluding the 
testimony of Barbara Snow and the video taping of the children 
that necessarily the children still would have been allowed to 
testify in court. Again, it may well be (since we are all 
speculating) that the tainting was so great that no such 
testimony either video tape or live could be permitted. 
Finally, having the children testify live without Barbara 
Snow's hearsay testimony would have given the defendant the right 
to confront the children without the damaging testimony 
of Barbara Snow and may also well have resulted in a different 
verdict. 
It is difficult to understand in a case with such close 
questions and of such importance to this man and his family how 
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the majority can affirm the decision without allowing the type of 
tai tual inqitiiy needed to justify Hie specula^ •• which the 
majority decision is based. At a minimum, Defendant is entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of probing with actual 
factual investigation as tu I lie reliability ot the evidence and 
the competency of his lower court counsel. This matter is far 
too serious i he dismissed on academic and speculative grounds. 
6 Conclusion. It is therefore respectfully submitted 
that the majority of this Court modify and amend its opinion in 
o r ci e i t h af proper e v i dent i a r y hearings •: a»i b e h e .1 d b e 1 o w t" o 
determine if the decision should be affirmed, dismissed, or a new 
trial granted. 
DATED this 4th day of November, 1989. 
Craig S. $ook 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
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